University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Political Science Publications

Department of Political Science

4-2012

The roots and consequences of Euroskepticism: an evaluation of
the United Kingdom Independence Party
John B. Sutcliffe
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/poliscipub
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Sutcliffe, John B.. (2012). The roots and consequences of Euroskepticism: an evaluation of the United
Kingdom Independence Party. Geopolitics, history and international relations, 4 (1), 107-127.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/poliscipub/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at Scholarship at
UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Geopolitics, History, and International Relations
Volume 4(1), 2012, pp. 107–127, ISSN 1948-9145

THE ROOTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EUROSKEPTICISM:
AN EVALUATION OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY
JOHN B. SUTCLIFFE
sutclif@uwindsor.ca
University of Windsor

ABSTRACT. This article examines the causes and consequences of Euroskepticism
through a study of the United Kingdom Independence Party. Based on an analysis of
UKIP’s election campaigns, policies and performance, the article examines the roots
of UKIP and its, potential, consequences for the British political system. The article
argues that UKIP provides an example of Euroskepticism as the “politics of opposition.” The party remains at the fringes of the political system and its leadership is
prepared to use misrepresentation and populist rhetoric in an attempt to secure support. The party, nevertheless, cannot be completely dismissed as a marginal force.
Its roots lie in the general popular and elite antipathy towards the European Union
and it has shown itself capable of attracting considerable electoral support in European
Parliament elections. It also has the potential to influence the policies of the major
political parties.
Keywords: Euroskepticism, political parties, Europe, Britain

1. Introduction
Across the European Union (EU) there has been a prominent and increasingly
studied rise in critical attitudes towards integration. While criticism of European integration has always existed to varying extents in different states, the
two decades since the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty have witnessed a more widespread and vocal skepticism about the
benefits of the European Union. This skepticism was evident in the 2005
referendums in France and the Netherlands that saw the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and in the 2008 Irish referendum rejection of the Lisbon
Treaty. It has also been evident in the rise of Euroskeptical political parties
and existing, often populist, parties adopting Euroskeptical positions as part
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of their political platform. In many EU member states, these political parties
enjoyed significant electoral success in both the 2004 and 2009 European
Parliamentary elections. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP),
for example, which was established in 1994 with the avowed goal of removing the United Kingdom from the European Union, returned 13 Members of
the European Parliament (MEPs) in the 2009 elections and placed second,
ahead of the governing Labor Party.
Alongside the development of critical attitudes towards the European Union
have come academic studies attempting to understand and explain the causes
and possible implications of Euroskepticism (see, for example, Szczerbiak and
Taggart 2008; Forster 2002; McLaren 2006; Taylor 2008). Diversity exists
within this literature. Some commentators argue that Euroskepticism is a
reflection of the maturation of the European Union’s political system, with
criticism developing as citizens become more aware of the policy decisions
made at the EU level (see Hix 2008). Others, including some national leaders
and governing parties, suggest that many critics do not fully understand what
they are criticizing (see “Who Cares about Europe” 2008). A different view
is that Euroskeptical attitudes are frequently adopted by political parties at
the fringes of their national political systems as part of the “politics of opposition” (see Mair 2001; Sitter 2001). There is also diversity evident in analyses
of the potential consequences of Euroskepticism. Some scholars see Euroskepticism as being marginal to existing party systems (Harmsen and Spiering
2004, 31–32; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a) while others see it as a potential
party realigning issue (Kriesi 2007).
This article analyzes the question of the causes and consequences of Euroskepticism in one national context through a focus on the United Kingdom
Independence Party’s policies, its election campaign platforms (particularly
its 2009 European Parliament election platform and 2010 general election
platform), its leadership, and its election results. The intention is to explain
the roots of UKIP’s criticism of the European Union and its place within the
United Kingdom. This analysis leads to a second line of questioning relating
to the potential consequences of UKIP’s existence. The article examines first
whether UKIP represents an extremist, and potentially negative, force in British
politics. Second, the article examines whether UKIP has the potential, in itself
or as a representative of a new cleavage, to transform the British party system.
2. Euroskepticism
What is Euroskepticism?
Various studies indicate that the “permissive consensus” representing widespread, if not deeply felt, popular support for the development of integration
in Europe has declined over the past two decades and been replaced by a
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more prominent and vocal opposition to the European Union (see Hix 2008;
Milner 2000; Taggart 1998). What is also apparent is that there is great
diversity within this criticism and opposition (see Harmsen and Spiering 2004;
Mair 2007; Forster 2002; Spiering 2004). This diversity is evident in so far
as opposition to the European integration comes from political forces from
both the right and the left, even within the same country. The focus of the
opposition is also diverse and depends in part on the country in which the
criticism is voiced. In some cases, critics advocate the abolition of the integration project or withdrawal from the project for the country in which they
are based. Taggart and Szczerbiak label this type of criticism as “Hard Euroskepticism” (2008b), which they identify as: “principled opposition to the
EU and European integration [which] can be seen in parties who think that
their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards
the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European
integration as it is currently conceived” (2008b, 7).
Other critics direct their opposition against specific EU policies, policy
outcomes or institutional features and seek to reform the EU rather than
abolish the entire project. Taggart and Szczerbiak label this type of criticism
“Soft Euroskepticism” (2008b).
The focus of this article is on “Hard Euroskepticism.” Even within this
type of critical perspective, however, there is evidence of a diversity of views.
It is, for example, the case that fundamental opposition to the European Union
is evident in political organizations found on both the right and left of the
political spectrum (see Evans 2000; Holmes 1996; Mudde 2007). What is
consistent across these different groups, however, is the view that the European Union as currently constituted is detrimental for their country and that
what is required is either a fundamental reform of the EU or their country’s
withdrawal from the EU.
What Accounts for Euroskepticism?
Given the growth and the diversity of Euroskeptic opinions throughout Europe,
it is perhaps not too surprising that many different explanations are offered to
account for this skepticism. It is widely accepted that the growth of critical
perspectives is linked to the development of the European Union itself (see
Mair 2007). As integration has progressed and become more visible in daily
economic and political life, a growing number of citizens and organizations
express opposition to these developments (Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley 2009).
Beyond this, however, disagreement exists. It is, for example, sometimes
asserted that critics of the European Union do not in fact understand what
they are criticizing, or indeed that they may not even be critical of the European Union at all. Instead, it is sometimes suggested that their criticisms are
in fact focused on domestic politicians or policy choices rather than the European Union itself. This view was prominently expressed by European leaders
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and EU political figures at the time of the French and Dutch rejections of
the Constitutional Treaty and the initial Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty
(see “Who Cares about Europe” 2008). The then European Commissioner from
Ireland, Charlie McCreevy, for example stated that the 2008 Irish referendum
result was “not a vote against the European Union. It is about a myriad of
other issues” (quoted in “Reaction to Irish Referendum on Lisbon Treaty”
2008).
A related view is that Euroskepticism is frequently based on misunderstanding of developments within the European Union. In his study of the
2008 Irish referendum, for example, John O’Brennan highlighted Irish citizens’
ignorance of the Lisbon Treaty’s contents as being a significant cause of their
rejection of the treaty (2009). He argues that “although the Irish remain among
the most enthusiastic about EU membership, there remains a significant knowledge vacuum, with a large majority of citizens professing to know little or
nothing about how decisions are made at the EU level and how the EU
institutions function” (O’Brennan 2009, 270). According to this analysis, then,
lack of popular understanding of the European Union and European integration may allow political space for political groups and parties to attract
support by misrepresenting the development of integration.
Another view links Euroskepticism to the party systems that exist within
European Union member states and argues that Euroskepticism manifests
itself differently in different political parties and different party systems (see
Taggart 1998). According to Paul Taggart, for example, Euroskepticism is
frequently most likely to be adopted by protest-based parties that stand at the
fringes of the existing party system and which are outside of government
(1998, 372). In this view, Euroskepticism is part of a more general opposition
to existing political systems and leadership structures and may be adopted by
these protest-parties or populist-parties in order to secure electoral support.
Taggart further argues that these parties are likely to be “parties for whom the
EU issue is a secondary issue which can relatively costlessly be appropriated
to strengthen their claims to be alternatives to the political centre” (1998, 384;
also Harmsen and Spiering 2004; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a). Sitter also
argues that the adoption of Euroskepticism is best understood as the “politics
of opposition” and that generally political parties will avoid adopting Euroskeptical positions to the extent that they aspire to be in government (2001,
27). According to these arguments, then, Euroskepticism is not necessarily a
prime objective but rather is adopted as part of a more general opposition
strategy and because it is perceived to be advantageous in electoral terms.
A common theme running through the accounts of Euroskepticism examined thus far is that this opposition need not necessarily be based on an
accurate understanding or portrayal of the European Union. An alternate
perspective is that critics do in fact understand the European Union. In this
view, criticism stems from opposition to what the European Union is and the
110

policies that emerge out of the EU’s institutional system. Martin Holmes,
for example, seeks to demonstrate that while there are multiple strands to
the Euroskeptic case, many of them are built upon serious analysis of the
European Union (see Holmes 1996; 2002). Holmes argues that: “All too often
the Euroskeptical case has not been debated, still less refuted, but pilloried
as unworthy jingoistic prejudice...” (1996, 1; see also Forster 2002). Simon
Hix also argues that it is wrong to dismiss popular opposition to the European
Union as based on ignorance of the European Union (2008, 50). Rather Hix
asserts that, since the 1990s in particular, information about the EU is widely
accessible and that “public understanding of the EU has grown as a result”
(2008, 54; Forster 2002, 8). In this setting, citizens are aware of decisions
made in the European Union and base their opinion of the EU on its impact
on their own economic and political preferences (Hix 2008, 62). Hix uses
this analysis to explain why some opponents of the EU are found on the right
and some on the left of the political spectrum. In the United Kingdom, for
example, EU social measures tend to be more interventionist than pre-existing
policies and therefore generate opposition from the right. In France, however,
these same measures are less interventionist than national norms and thus
generate opposition from the left (Hix 2008, 63).
Other studies of Euroskepticism highlight country-specific characteristics
in explaining the form and prevalence of skeptical opinions towards the European Union. Medrano, for example, studies the impact of history and national
culture in framing both elite and popular attitudes towards the European Union
(Medrano 2003). Daddow (2006) also points to the importance of identity
construction in his analysis of British Euroskepticism. In this analysis he
highlights the role played by both the national press and history education in
perpetuating the idea of Europe as the “other” and concludes that a more
positive view of Europe will require a change in the way the nation views
itself (Daddow 2006, 84). A further example of a focus on distinct national
characteristics in the explanation of Euroskepticism is Mark Aspinwall’s
study of the importance of the British first-past-the-post electoral system in
explaining the prevalence of Euroskepticism within the major British political
parties (2000).
Overall, then, a variety of different possible explanations of the development of Euroskepticism are offered. This article examines these explanations
through a case study of the development and policies of the United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP).
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3. Euroskepticism in the United Kingdom:
The United Kingdom Independence Party
Opposition to the European Union is particularly evident in the United Kingdom. This opposition manifests itself in public opinion polls indicating a
widespread public belief that the country’s membership of the EU is not a
good thing (see Hix 2008). It is also present within the policies adopted by
both the major political parties as well as by other more marginal political
forces (see Bale 2006; Baker et al. 2008). Former Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, while always reticent about the progress of European integration,
became a vocal and prominent hard Euroskeptic voice after leaving office in
1990. In her 2002 book, for example, Thatcher argued that in the absence of
fundamental reform, the United Kingdom would be better placed leaving the
European Union and applying for membership of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (Thatcher 2002, 403).
The overall place of the United Kingdom within the European Union is
extensively studied (see, for example, Booker and North 2003; George 1998;
Wall 2008; Young 1998). These studies highlight that hostility toward European integration is not a new phenomenon within the United Kingdom and
that it has found expression within both Conservative and Labor governments
throughout the EU’s existence. Division on the issue of the European Union
has been particularly prevalent within the Conservative Party over the last
two decades and has even appeared to dominate that party’s internal politics
at several key moments (Baker et al. 2008; Baker and Seawright 1998; Sowemimo 1996). These moments include the controversial parliamentary debates
over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Baker, Gamble and Ludlam
1993; Berrington and Hague 1998) and the series of recent leadership contests
(see Bale 2006). Opposition to the European Union has also been evident
within the Labor Party and the policies of the 1997–2010 Labor Government
with respect to the European Union were often similar to those of the Conservative opposition (see Bale 2006). Labor opponents of the European Union
have frequently drawn attention to the perceived dominance of big business
within the development of the European market place along with a general
opposition to the loss of sovereign decision-making authority (see Rowley
1996; Baker at al. 2008).
Alongside the existence of Euroskeptical opinions and policies within the
major political parties, the last two decades have witnessed the emergence of
political parties and groups advancing positions that can be defined as “hard
Euroskepticism;” that is they are seeking either the fundamental reform of
the European Union or the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU. Sir
James Goldsmith, for example, formed the Referendum Party to contest seats
in the 1997 UK general election and which secured votes on the basis of its
demand for a referendum on Britain’s place within the EU (see McAllister
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and Studlar 2000). One of the Referendum Party’s successor organizations is
the non-party Democracy Movement, which believes that liberal democracy
in the UK is “fundamentally undermined by the single currency, the EU
Constitution / Lisbon Treaty and the drive to create a Brussels-based system
of government, which will result in all major decisions being taken at the
European Union centre by undemocratic institutions” (Democracy Movement
2005). The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is arguably the most
prominent of these Euroskeptical organizations.
The United Kingdom Independence Party was formed by Alan Sked in
1993 and emerged out of his campaign against the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty (see Abedi and Lundberg 2009). Since that time the party has faced a
number of controversies including, for example, disputes over its leadership
as well as its purported links to the populist far-right British National Party
(BNP). In spite of these controversies the party has enjoyed some notable
electoral successes which have made it a significant minor party within the
British political system (see Table 1). Indeed, UKIP’s electoral success is one
factor that led Webb to question the accuracy of referring to the UK as a two
party system (Webb 2005). The major breakthrough for UKIP came in the
2004 European Parliament election when the party placed third by securing
over 16 per cent of the vote and 12 Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) (see Baker and Sherrington 2005). The party improved on this performance in the 2009 European Parliament election when it increased its vote
share to 16.5 per cent and secured one extra seat (from a smaller UK total).
Most remarkably, UKIP’s share of the vote meant that it placed second to the
Conservative Party and pushed the governing Labor Party into third place in
terms of vote share (Whitaker and Lynch 2011; Ford, Goodwin and Cutts
2012).
Table 1: UKIP’s Electoral Performance
Election
% of Vote (# Votes)
1997 General Election
0.3 (105, 722)
1999 EP Election
6.9 (696, 057)
2001 General Election
1.5 (390, 563)
2004 EP Election
16.1 (2, 660, 768)
2005 General Election
2.2 (603, 298)
2009 EP Election
16.5 (2, 498, 226)
2010 General Election
3.1 (919, 546)

# of Seats
0
3
0
12
0
13
0

In spite of this success, as noted by Usherwood (2008), UKIP has received
relatively limited academic attention (although see Hayton 2010; Whitaker
and Lynch 2011; Ford, Goodwin and Gutts 2012). One possible explanation
for this is the fact that the party has been unable to make a major breakthrough at the national level and has failed to return a single member of
parliament. Although the party’s vote share has increased at the last three
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general elections (see Table 1), it secured less than 3 per cent of the national
vote in 2005 and in spite of running almost 500 candidates in that election,
the party failed in its goal of electing a candidate to parliament (Webb 2005).
The party also failed to win a seat in the 2010 general election. In terms of
electoral success, therefore, UKIP remains a minor party on the national
stage. One explanation for this is the first-past-the-post electoral system used
in UK general elections, which penalizes smaller parties at the expense of
the larger parties, as compared to the system of proportional representation
used for EP elections (see Aspinwall 2000; Usherwood 2008). It is also
potentially explained by the argument that European Parliament elections are
“second-order” elections that allow voters to vote differently than they do in
national elections and potentially use them to cast an electoral judgment on
the party in power at the national level (see Reif 1997; Reif and Schmitt
1980). In this view, UKIP has enjoyed more success in European Parliament
elections mainly because voters do not consider these to be significant elections. This argument will be examined below in relation to a wider analysis
of the significance of UKIP. First, the article examines the major themes in
UKIP’s policies and electoral platforms. In so doing, it analyses their brand
of Euroskepticism and seeks to explain its roots and development.
The Policies of UKIP
Belying the idea that it is a single-issue party, UKIP has policies on a widerange of issues including, for example, taxation, health care, transportation and
defense (see UKIP 2010a; UKIP 2004; Usherwood 2008, 257). Nevertheless,
the party’s central policy goal, and its raison d’être, is to secure UK withdrawal from the European Union. In its 2009 EP election manifesto, the party
stated that UK membership of the EU “should be replaced with a genuine
free trade agreement similar to those enjoyed by other non-EU nations such
as Switzerland, Norway and Mexico. We want friendship and free trade with
our European neighbors – not political union” (UKIP 2009a). The overwhelming majority of UKIP’s other policies stem from this starting point. In the
case of defense policy, for example, UKIP calls for increased spending on the
military in the continued context of NATO membership and independence
from the EU. Similarly, the party calls for renewed control over the country’s
fishing grounds to be established outside of the EU’s common fisheries
policy. The party further claims that many of its spending commitments can
be financed through costs saving as a result of withdrawal from the EU.
The exact details of the policies advocated by UKIP are diverse and have
been contested within the party (Usherwood 2008). Nevertheless, certain
interrelated themes emerge within UKIP’s policies and campaign; themes
that are often replicated in Euroskeptic parties across the European Union.
First, the party is intensely critical of the extent to which the European Union
has challenged British state sovereignty and advocates restoring sovereign
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decision-making power by withdrawing from the EU (Webb 2005). UKIP,
for example, asserts that “the EU agenda is complete political union with all
the main functions of national government taken over by the bureaucratic
institutions of Brussels.” UKIP continues by suggesting that the EU is “an
alien system of government that will ultimately prove to be totally unacceptable” (UKIP, 2009b). UKIP MEP Marta Andreasen expressed these sentiments
when she referred to the European Commission as a “political elite who wants
to acquire more and more power.” She further argued that: “The EU wants
to have one government, one superstate, one law and one justice” (quoted in
Sloan 2009).
Related to these fears about the loss of sovereignty, UKIP argues that
EU membership poses a threat to British democracy. UKIP claims that an
increasing number of issues are being determined at the EU level rather than
within the British political system and that consequently British voters are
losing control over those decisions. In advance of the 2005 general election,
for example, the then party leader Roger Knapman appealed for votes by
arguing that: “This is the opportunity for you to back UKIP and get our
country back” (BBC 2005). Indeed, the title of the party’s 2005 general election
manifesto was We Want Our Country Back (UKIP 2005). The party also claims
that the governing political parties have deliberately kept the development
of European integration a secret from the British public and have concealed
the extent to which sovereignty has been delegated (in line with the argument
made by Booker and North 2003). Former UKIP leader, Lord Pearson (who
was elected in November 2009) made this point when he argued that his
party was “for people who now for many years have seen through the lies of
our political class and our main political parties, particularly in regard to our
relationship with the European Union.” In the same speech he stated: “If
you want to go on being deceived by the main parties, then stay in them and
vote for them – if you don’t, the only way forward now is UKIP” (quoted in
Norman, 2009). In this sense, UKIP is establishing itself as a party that stands
in contrast to all of the major governing political parties (see Abedi and
Lundberg 2009; Taggart 1998; Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012).
A third theme evident within UKIP’s policy platform is the preservation
of British identity. In the period since 2002 in particular, UKIP has developed
a range of policies linked to immigration and asylum (Usherwood 2008). In
2007, for example, UKIP called for a five year freeze on immigration into
Britain. The party made the link between this policy and identity explicit when
it recommended that: “No one should be admitted unless they are fluent in
English, have the required educational qualifications, demonstrate loyalty to
the UK, its laws and values, and can support themselves financially, with no
recourse to public funds – and this to apply equally to their dependents” (UKIP,
2007a).
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The party also advocates a slate of policies that it claims are aimed at
“restoring Britishness.” These policies deal not only with immigration but
also with opposition to the devolution of power within the United Kingdom.
They are also linked to the recent call to limit the wearing of the burka in
the United Kingdom. Lord Pearson claims that the burka is “incompatible
with Britain’s values of freedom and democracy” (quoted in “UKIP to call…”
2010). Leader Nigel Farage introduced the proposed ban by arguing that the
burka is a symbol of an “increasingly divided Britain” and of the fact that a
different culture is “being forced on Britain” (quoted in “UKIP chief…”
2010). The predominant theme of all of these policies is that British identity
is under threat and needs to be preserved. The European Union is one cause of
this threat in the eyes of UKIP because it reduces national control over key
areas of national life including immigration and asylum policies (see UKIP
2009c).
The existence of the United Kingdom Independence Party, and the policies
it promotes, to a great extent, provide an example of Euroskepticism as the
politics of opposition (Sitter 2001). The party seeks electoral advantage from
its advocacy of withdrawal from the European Union. In assuming this position,
it seeks to position itself as distinct from the major political parties, and
particularly the Conservative Party, and has drawn support from these parties,
particularly at European Parliament elections (Whitaker and Lynch 2011;
Hayton 2010; Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012). It is not the case that the
political party has grafted a hard Euroskeptical position onto its pre-existing
electoral agenda only for the purpose of securing votes (Taggart 1998; Sitter
2001). Within the United Kingdom this type of Euroskepticism is more readily
linked with the British National Party. In the case of UKIP, withdrawal
from the EU is the core of its platform rather than an appendage to it. The
members of the party have gravitated towards it from other political parties
in large part because of its stance on the European Union (Usherwood 2008;
Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012).
There is, nevertheless, a significant extent to which it is useful to see
UKIP’s existence and policies as the politics of an organization at the fringes
of the political system. Analysis of UKIP and its policies demonstrate that
its leaders misinterpret the European Union and its implications. At the very
least, there can be little question that the party employs radical rhetoric and
launches populist appeals in an attempt to secure both media attention and
votes. A recent example of this tactic was the personal attack launched by
UKIP’s leader, Nigel Farage, on the President of the European Council,
Herman van Rompuy, in the European Parliament. In his widely reported
comments, Farage asserted that van Rompuy has “the charisma of a damp
rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk” (quoted in Charter 2010).
This speech resulted in Farage being fined by the European Parliament president but it was successful in securing media and public attention. It also
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provides an example of UKIP basing its appeal on a partial truth but doing
so in a radical fashion. When the EU’s heads of state and government selected
Herman van Rompuy as the first individual to fill the position of European
Council president, there was considerable commentary that questioned the
decision on the grounds that van Rompuy is relatively unknown outside of
Belgium (see Traynor et al. 2009; Kirkup and Waterfield 2009). This commentary came particularly in the light of the fact that the initial proposal for
a permanent European Council president had in part been intended to give
the European Union a more visible international face (Crum 2009).
A second example of UKIP basing its appeal on an exaggeration of the
implications of European integration is its claims that it has created, or is in
the process of creating, a European superstate centralized in Brussels. This
contention, as noted above, is pervasive in UKIP’s policy documents and
public statements. In his criticisms of Herman van Rompuy, for example,
Nigel Farage asserted: “I have no doubt that your intention is to be the quiet
assassin of European democracy and of European nation states” (“Nigel Farage
summoned…” 2010). The party’s 2010 general election manifesto makes
frequent reference to the idea of a United States of Europe or a European
superstate (UKIP 2010b). In the section on foreign affairs and international
trade, for example, UKIP claims to recognize “Britain as a global player with
a global destiny and not a regional state within a ‘United States of Europe”’
(UKIP 2010b, 6). It is certainly the case that EU membership does entail a
pooling of sovereignty and it does mean that some decisions that were previously taken by the British government and parliament are now taken collectively within the EU’s institutional structure. More measured analyses of
the European Union, however, argue that this pooling of sovereignty has not
created a superstate, and arguably will not do so. Certainly this is the argument
made by both Andrew Moravcsik (2001) and Anand Menon (2008). Menon,
for example, cogently argues that the European Union has been created by the
member states because it is in their interests and that power remains at the
state level. He states that: “The European Union, for from representing some
kind of artificial construct separate from its constituent member states, is, in
reality, a tool created and dominated by them” (Menon 2008, 106). Even
scholars who suggest that the European Union has had a significant impact
on the participating states are far more likely to refer to it as a multi-level
polity, or quasi-federal system, rather than a centralized superstate as claimed
by UKIP (Hooghe and Marks 2001). There is much to suggest, then, that
UKIP is playing to the politics of fear rather than presenting an accurate
analysis of the European Union.
A third example of this relates to UKIP’s claim that the development of
the European Union is a secretive, elite process that is closed to the public.
Lord Pearson, in a House of Lords debate, claimed that “most of our national
law is now imposed by the secret Brussels system of law-making” (UKIP
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2007b). In its 2010 election manifesto, UKIP claims that it will address this
situation by giving “power back to Westminster and to the people” (UKIP
2010b, 2). In contrast to these claims, a number of commentators have
noted that although policy-making in the European Union is complicated, it
is in fact remarkably open (see Moravcsik 2002; Richardson 2006). Former
Commissioner, and Conservative cabinet minister, Leon Brittan refers to the
extensive consultations that occur in the preparation of EU initiatives. As he
indicates: “The Commission does not prepare legislation in isolation from
the extensive committees of national civil servants, but it does sometimes suit
some member states to imply that they had nothing to do with the terrible
proposal that has just emanated from “Brussels’” (Brittan 2000, 5; also Menon
2008).
Leon Brittan’s analysis, in part, provides one explanation for the approach
adopted by UKIP and its success in securing a share of the UK vote. Governments in general have not been active in providing information about the
European Union to generally apathetic populations (see O’Brennan 2009 in
relation to the 2008 Irish referendum campaign; Mair 2007). Indeed, it is
often the case that governments campaign either on the basis of standing up
for their country against the “European Union” or on the basis of their own
success without mention of the impact of the European Union on this success
(see Menon 2008). This is particularly the case in the United Kingdom with
its long-standing popular and media tendency to view continental Europe as
the “other” (see Daddow 2006; Harmsen and Spiering 2004, 16), a generally
low level of popular enthusiasm for the European Union (Spiering 2004),
and the frequent tendency of British governments to be on the minority side
of EU debates (see George 1998; Wall 2008; Young 1998). In this context,
a hard Euroskeptical message has fertile soil into which it can sink its roots.
The development and success of UKIP cannot, therefore, be separated from
the United Kingdom’s difficult relationship with European integration. It is,
rather, an extreme manifestation of widespread popular and elite critical
attitudes with respect to the European Union that are evident in the press
(Anderson 2004) and within the major political parties (Holmes 1996).
At the same time, UKIP’s existence and policy platform is also linked to
the lack of clarity within the European Union and EU debates about direction
of integration or its final destination. Disagreement has been evident since the
earliest days of the integration project and different definitions of integration
exist (Taylor 2008). There are competing visions about what European integration is designed to achieve and political disagreements are inevitable
given the size of the organization and the diversity of political views that it
contains (Hix 2008). To a considerable extent, UKIP builds its campaign based
on this lack of clarity about the future of European integration. UKIP is able
to play to fears that are prominent within the United Kingdom about the
potential for the European Union to develop into a superstate. The fact that
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there is no widely accepted definition of European integration’s final destination
makes it easier for UKIP to construct a political campaign that exaggerates
and distorts the implications of integration.
4. The Consequences of the United Kingdom Independence Party
Analysis of the policies adopted by UKIP and the roots of these policies
inevitably requires an examination of the political consequences of the party’s
existence. This in turn entails addressing two related questions. First, to what
extent does UKIP’s presence within the political system represent a radical,
extremist force? Second, to what extent has UKIP been successful in influencing the British political system?
With respect to these questions, the evidence provided by UKIP is mixed.
The party’s central policy goal of withdrawal from the EU is in itself radical
and distinguishes it from any of the major parties. Yet its general opposition
to the European Union fits with the widespread existence of Euroskeptical
opinion within the United Kingdom, as examined earlier (see Spiering 2004).
A brief analysis of UKIP’s membership and supporters also presents a mixed
picture. On the one hand, the leadership has frequently tried to distance the
party from the idea that it contains a far-right, extremist component. UKIP
party leaders have, for example, attempted to distance themselves from the
British National Party (BNP) and the far right in general (Hayton 2010).
UKIP’s leaders have consistently resisted the formation of an electoral pact
with the BNP, including most recently in advance of the 2009 EP elections (see
Porter 2008). In response to the suggestion of an electoral agreement, Nigel
Farage responded that: “There are no circumstances, no possible situations,
in which we would even consider doing any type of deal with the BNP whatsoever…we are a non-racist, non-sectarian party” (quoted in “UKIP rejects…”
2008). The party’s web-site further seeks to identify the distinctiveness from
the BNP when it states that “UKIP believes in civic nationalism, which is
inclusive and open to anyone of any ethnic or religious background who wishes
to identify with Britain. We reject the “blood and soil” ethnic nationalism of
extremist parties” (UKIP 2010c).
Yet the very fact that the leadership has so often had to issue denials of a
link to the far-right lends weight to the argument that UKIP contains, or is
susceptible to, such an element. It is certainly the case that other party leaders
have sought to portray UKIP as an extremist force. The two most recent Conservative leaders, Michael Howard and David Cameron, have both downplayed
the significance of UKIP while at the same time suggesting that it represents
a “lunatic fringe” of British politics. In 2004 Michael Howard referred to
UKIP as “cranks and gadflies” (quoted in White 2004; see also Baker and
Sherrington 2005. This was the title given to Mark Daniel’s (2005) insider
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account of UKIP). In 2006 David Cameron labeled UKIP a “bunch of fruit
cakes and loonies and closet racists” (quoted in Shipman 2006).
While these criticisms of UKIP can at least partially be dismissed as
politically motivated attempts to limit the extent to which UKIP draws support away from the Conservative Party, it is also the case that there are other
reasons to suggest that UKIP’s populist dimension has attracted voters and
supporters from the far right (see Daily Telegraph 2009; Usherwood 2002).
The party’s immigration and “Britishness” policies have similarities with the
policies advocated by the British National Party (BNP). The BNP’s 2009 EP
manifesto, for example, called “for British control over British borders so as
to stop unlimited and uncontrolled immigration…” (British National Party
2009). The BNP, like UKIP, also called for the UK’s withdrawal from the
European Union. The possible infiltration of UKIP by the far right was identified by its founding member (see Sked 2001) and the overlap between UKIP
and BNP potential voters has been identified by the study of Margetts, John
and Weir (2004). In the words of Margetts et al., UKIP draws “upon the same
well of social and political attitudes among the public as the BNP and have
the potential to convert such attitudes into votes...” (2004, 12; see also John
and Margetts 2009). This is in part the conclusion reached by Ford et al. In
their study of UKIP’s electoral support, they conclude that the profile of
UKIP’s core supporters (young, disaffected with mainstream politics, and
anxious about immigration) is similar to that of the BNP (Ford, Goodwin and
Cutts 2012). Indeed, it is sometimes argued that UKIP provides a “polite”
alternative to the BNP and thus a more legitimate route for the policies
advocated by the BNP to enter the political mainstream (Ford, Goodwin and
Cutts 2012; Hayton 2010).
The answer to the question of the extent to which UKIP has influenced
the political system is also mixed. There is certainly considerable evidence
to suggest that the party remains at the fringes of the political system and
that indeed it basis its appeal on being outside of the mainstream. As identified earlier, the party has not been able to make a major breakthrough in
national elections and is yet to win a single seat in the British parliament. It is
also the case that the party has experienced considerable internal upheaval and
dispute, particularly with respect to its leadership (see Abedi and Lundberg
2009; Usherwood 2008). One of the most notable examples of this was when
former television presenter Robert Kilroy-Silk launched a failed challenge for
the party leadership in 2004 and then left to form his own political organization, Veritas. The most recent leadership changes occurred when Lord Pearson
was selected in 2009 to replace Nigel Farage, who stepped down in order to
focus on his 2010 general election campaign, but who subsequently was reelected as party leader in November 2010. While any political party can
experience internal upheaval, the level of dispute within UKIP, it having had
six party leaders since 1997, suggests an organization that is struggling to
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develop a consistent political face and voice. Usherwood (2008) drew attention
to this when he identified internal sources of division within UKIP, including the ideological diversity of its membership.
At the same time, there are also grounds for arguing that UKIP is a potentially significant force for change within the British political system. First,
also as noted above, the party has enjoyed considerable success in European
Parliament elections including placing second in the 2009 election. Although
these may be considered second order elections (Reif 1997), it is nevertheless
significant that over 2.5 million voters were willing to vote for the party in
both 2004 and 2009. It is also the case that while the party presents itself as
quite different from the traditional governing parties, it nevertheless has links
with these parties, and particularly the Conservatives, on several levels. A
significant number of UKIP’s leadership, membership and voters are former
Conservative Party members or voters. This is true, for example, of both the
former and current UKIP leaders, Nigel Farage and Lord Pearson. Nigel
Farage left the Conservative Party in 1992 following the Conservative government’s signature of the Maastricht Treaty and Lord Pearson was one of
four Conservative members of the House of Lords expelled from the party in
2004 after openly urging support for UKIP in the EP election (see Baker and
Sherrington 2005, 310). It is also the case that many Conservative voters are
at least willing to contemplate voting for UKIP (see Margetts et al. 2004)
and several major Conservative Party donors have switched their donations
to UKIP (see Kite et al. 2009; Usherwood 2008). In the 2005 general election UKIP claimed that voters switching to UKIP cost the Conservatives a
possible 27 seats (see Bale 2006) and a Sunday Telegraph survey suggested
the Conservatives feared losing support to UKIP in the 2010 general election
(see Kite et al. 2009). Stuart Wheeler, a former major donor to the Conservative
Party stated that: “UKIP cost the Conservative Party 20 or 30 seats in the
last general election. Because people feel so strongly about this subject now
they are likely to cost them more than that next time” (quoted in Kite et al.
2009).
This overlap between Conservative and UKIP support is indicative of
one possible way in which UKIP already impacts upon the political system
and may do so in the future. There is some evidence to indicate that UKIP’s
existence and campaigning has influenced the Conservative Party’s policies
with respect to the European Union. Some members of the Conservative Party
have called for the party to adopt a more Euroskeptical stance in response to
UKIP (see Baker and Sherrington 2005). Pressure from the Euroskeptical wing
of the Conservative Party was at least in part responsible for Conservative
Party leader David Cameron making and finally fulfilling his 2005 leadership election pledge to withdraw the party from the European People’s Party
in the European Parliament (see Lynch and Whitaker 2007).
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It is not the case that UKIP has so far transformed the UK party system
along a new cleavage of opposition to the European Union (Kriesi 2007).
The hard Euroskepticism advocated by UKIP remains at the fringes of the
existing party system, which is further emphasized by UKIP’s failure to win
a single seat in the 2010 general election (see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a;
Sitter 2001). Yet in the United Kingdom, where there is a deep-seated popular
distrust of European integration, UKIP has not been without influence and
helps add to that popular and political mistrust and the radicalization of opposition to the European Union (Usherwood 2002; Hayton 2010; John and
Margetts 2009).
5. Conclusion
The United Kingdom Independence Party is a party of paradoxes that is
difficult to analyze. It is a party that is highly prone to internal division, but
which has endured over time and has been capable of securing significant
electoral support. It is a party that paints itself as radical and distinct from
the governing parties and its leadership is prone to using radical, populist
rhetoric. Yet its message is one that resonates with British political society
and within other political parties, particularly the Conservative Party, and it
has shown itself capable of attracting significant levels of electoral support.
It is perhaps best to see UKIP as a fringe party (a party of opposition) and
its goal of UK withdrawal from the United Kingdom remains at the margins
of British politics. It adopts the strategies of opposition parties that see themselves as unlikely to form part of government. UKIP, for example, asserts
that other parties lie to the electorate and that its message consists of “straight
talking” (see UKIP 2010b). It is also prepared to advance its goals using
populist rhetoric that distorts the reality of the European Union. In line with
the argument that it is a party of opposition at the fringes of the political
mainstream is the fact that the party has yet to translate its electoral success
at the European Parliament level into sustained publicity and success at the
national level. In spite of this, the party is a relevant political force within
British politics. To understand why, it is necessary to examine both the
development of the European Union and the domestic roots of UKIP. The
inevitable lack of clarity about the future of European integration allows
political space for the populist rhetoric employed by UKIP. At the same
time, UKIP has developed out of the long-standing opposition to European
integration that is evident at both the popular and elite levels within the
British polity and its activities and rhetoric helps to sustain the opposition.
There is some evidence to suggest that UKIP helps influence British debate
on the European Union. While UKIP remains at the fringes of the political
system, its message has resonance within the wider British political system.
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